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• Welcome & 2008 Edelman Reprise: Cynthia Barnhart, Team from Netherlands Railways
• Omega Rho Distinguished Lecture: Karla Hoffman
• Nobel Laureate Roger Myerson
• IFORS Distinguished Lecture: Michel Balinski
• Practice/MAS Keynote
• Philip McCord Morse Lecture
• Daniel Cook
Sunday, October 12
10:00am-10:50am
 Welcome
Cynthia Barnhart, President, INFORMS
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs
Civil and Environmental Engineering and Engineering Systems
School of Engineering
Co-director, Operations Research Center
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Reprise Presentation
Edelman Competition 2008 Award Winner
The New Dutch Timetable: The O.R. Revolution
Netherlands Railways: Erwin Abbink, Pieter-Jan Fioole, Dennis Huisman, Leo Kroon, Roelof Ybema, Bert Meerstadt
University of Padua: Matteo Fischetti
Erasmus University Rotterdam: Gábor Maróti
CWI: Lex Schrijver
Safiro Software Solutions: Adri Steenbeek
 In December 2006, Netherlands Railways introduced a completely new timetable, designed to facilitate further growth of passenger and freight transport on a highly utilized railway network on one hand, and to improve the robustness of the timetable in order to reduce the number of train delays in the operation, on the other hand. The construction of a railway timetable from scratch for about 5,500 daily trains was a complex puzzle. To support this whole process, sophisticated operations research techniques were used to generate several timetables, one of which was finally selected and implemented. Furthermore, the costs of a railway operator are mainly determined by the rolling stock and crew schedules. Two innovative OR tools were used to come up with efficient schedules for these two resources. The more efficient resource schedules and the increased number of passengers already resulted in an annual additional profit of 40 million Euros ($60 million). It is expected that this will increase to 70 million Euros ($105 million) in coming years. However, the benefits of the new timetable for the Dutch society as a whole are much higher: more trains are transporting more passengers on the same railway infrastructure, and all these trains run more on time than ever before. As a result, future growth in transportation demand can be handled by rail transport allowing cities to remain accessible. Moreover, the emission of greenhouse gases can be reduced.
Sunday, October 12
3:10pm-4:00pm
Auctions: Why are they proliferating and what do you need to know to participate?
Karla Hoffman
Professor, Systems Engineering and Operations Research
School of Information Technology and Engineering
George Mason University
The advent of the Internet has led to the creation of truly global marketplaces in which sales of everything from low-cost used merchandise to billion dollar government procurements are conducted by auction. While some auction designs have been extremely successful, others have failed disastrously. This talk will describe a variety of alternative auction designs, and will explore why one design is likely to be more appropriate than another for a given application. We will begin with a brief history of auctions, provide reasons for eBay’s spectacular success, and highlight the Internet’s impact on auction theory and practice. We will then move on to a discussion of the strategies that are available to bidders in the most-utilized auction formats, thereby providing each of you with hints on how to be more successful when participating in auctions. Throughout the talk, we will highlight the role that operations research analysts can play in designing, running,\ and assisting participants in business-to-business and high-stakes government auctions.
 Karla Hoffman is a Professor in the Systems Engineering and Operations Research Department at George Mason University where she had been Chair for five years ending in 2001. She received her BS in mathematics from Rutgers University, and her MBA and D.Sc. from George Washington University. She worked as a mathematician in the Operations Research Department of the Center for Applied Mathematics of the National Institute of Standards and Technology where, in1984, she was awarded the Applied Research Award for her research in solving large combinatorial optimization problems. Her other awards include George Mason University's Distinguished Faculty Award, the INFORMS Fellows Award, and the George E. Kimball Medal. She was President of INFORMS in 1999 and has also served on the Executive Committees of ORSA and the Mathematical Programming Society. Dr. Hoffman’s primary area of research is auction design and testing, and combinatorial optimization. Her research focuses on the development of new algorithms for solving complex problems arising in industry and government. She is currently a consultant to the FAA on auction design for arrival and takeoff slots and had previously consulted to the FCC on spectrum auctions. She has developed crew and fleet scheduling algorithms for the airline industry, real-time scheduling algorithms for truck and bus transportation, consults to the military on a variety of routing and scheduling problems and has advised the telecommunications industry on capital budgeting.
Monday, October 13
10:00am-10:50am
Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory
Roger B. Myerson
2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences Winner
Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor, Professor of Economics
University of Chicago
Mechanism design has extended the scope of economic analysis by adding incentive constraints to resource constraints in our definition of the economic problem. Incentive constraints provide an
analytical framework for understanding failures of allocative efficiency, showing how such failures may depend on the initial allocation of property rights in a society. But mechanism-design theory
changes the basic object of analysis from the resource allocation to the social plan or allocation mechanism that specifies how resource allocations should depend on people's information. Concepts of incentive efficiency can be applied to identify good institutional rules or mechanisms, taking incentive constraints into account. The cases for collectivism or private ownership may depend on trade-offs between different kinds of incentive problems: moral hazard and adverse selection.
 Roger B. Myerson was awarded the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. He was recognized for his contributions to mechanism design theory, initiated by co-winner Leonid Hurwicz of the University of Minnesota, and which Dr. Myerson further developed with others, including co-winner Eric Maskin of the Institute for Advanced Study. Dr. Myerson has made seminal contributions to the fields of economics and political science. In game theory he introduced a refinement of Nash's equilibrium concept, called "proper equilibrium." He has applied game theoretic tools to political science to study and compare electoral systems, and he also developed fundamental ideas of mechanism design, such as the revelation principle and "revenue-equivalence theorem." Dr. Myerson also has developed computer software for auditing formulas and for simulation and decision analysis for use with Microsoft spreadsheet software. He is the author of Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict (1991) and Probability Models for Economic Decisions (2005). Myerson also has published numerous articles in Econometrica, Mathematics of Operations Research and the International Journal of Game Theory, for which he served as an editorial board member for 10 years. During his 25-year tenure at Northwestern University, Dr. Myerson twice served as a Visiting Professor in Economics at Chicago. He joined the Chicago faculty in 2001. He received his A.B., summa cum laude, and S.M. in applied mathematics in 1973 from Harvard University and a Ph.D., also in applied mathematics, from Harvard University in 1976.
Monday, October 13
3:10pm-4:00pm
IFORS Distinguished Lecture
One-Vote, One-Value: The Majority Judgement
Michel Balinski
Directeur de Recherche de classe exceptionnelle
École Polytechnique and CNRS, Paris
Mechanisms of every imaginable type have been invented across the ages to designate the winners and orders of finish among competing skaters, wines, restaurants, universities, beauty queens …and political candidates. The traditional theory of social choice asks: how are the “evaluations” of voters or judges to be amalgamated into a decision of the electorate or jury? It answers: there is no good method (the Condorcet paradox, Arrow’s impossibility theorem, etc.).
A new theory models the problem differently. Arrow’s theorem now says there is no satisfactory mechanism unless there is a common language of measuring the qualities or the performances of competitors. But when there is a common language – and practice shows they exist and can be defined – then one simple, practical mechanism that has been tested and applied should be used: the majority judgement.
 Michel Balinski, a Williams graduate, studied at MIT and Princeton. He has taught at Princeton, Penn, CUNY Graduate Center, Yale and SUNY, Stony Brook. Since 1982 he has been Directeur de Recherche de classe exceptionnelle, CNRS and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris, and Director of the Laboratoire d’Econométrie (1989-1999). He was awarded the Lanchester Prize in 1965, and an honorary degree in mathematics from the University of Augsburg in 2004. He is the founding editor of Mathematical Programming and a past President of the Mathematical Programming Society. Dr. Balinski is the author of Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote (1982, reissued 2001, with H. P. Young) and Le suffrage universel inachevé (2004), and author or co-author of some one hundred scientific articles (OR, mathematics and other journals). His principal current interest is the theory and applications of ranking and the design of electoral systems. One of his electoral systems is used in Zürich, Switzerland.
Co-sponsored by CPMS, the Practice Section of INFORMS, and the Military Applications Society
Monday, October 13
3:10pm-4:00pm
Innovative Methods Required for Future Challenges
David D. Halverson
Director, Force Development, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8
U.S. Army
Our nation’s security requirements have changed significantly during the last decade. For the next twenty years there will be a period of protracted confrontation among state, non-state and individual actors who use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. Given this setting, the U.S. Army is developing a viable combination of alternative materiel and non-materiel solutions based on revised strategic guidance and doctrine. The army is undertaking a quantum leap forward in modern warfare essential to fielding the capabilities required to prevail in combat. This modernization is being accomplished within given constraints while addressing critical capability gaps and risks to our security.
 David D. Halverson was awarded a Bachelor of Science Degree from the United States Military Academy in 1979, and a Master of Science degree in Operations Research and Systems Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1989. He has held a variety of troop and staff positions, both in the U.S. and overseas. In June of 2001, Halverson became the CENTCOM J3, Chief of Plans and planned, coordinated and executed war plans for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. On January 2007, he assumed duties as the Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization. Currently, Halverson serves as the Director of Force Development, G-8. Awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Bronze Star, Legion Of Merit with three Oak Leaf Clusters, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters, Joint Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Army Achievement Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, Humanitarian Service Medal, Joint Unit Medal, Korean Defense Service Medal, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, Army Staff Badge and the Parachutist Badge.
Tuesday, October 14
10:00am-10:50am
Operations Research and Homeland Security: From Models to Implementation
Lawrence M. Wein
Paul E. Holden Professor of Management Science
Graduate School of Business
Stanford University
We give a brief description of our research on four topics in homeland security and public health: preparedness and response to a bioterror anthrax attack and to a bioterror attack on the food supply, routes of transmission and infection control for pandemic influenza, and biometrics (e.g., fingerprint matching) to prevent terrorists from entering the country. We focus on the modeling, the policy recommendations and the implementation of these recommendations. At the end of the talk, we attempt to draw lessons about policy implementation from these examples and from examples from our other homeland security work, including a bioterror smallpox attack, preventing nuclear weapons from entering the country on a shipping container, preventing nuclear weapons from entering a city, and preventing terrorists from sneaking across the U.S.-Mexico border.
 Lawrence M. Wein is the Paul E. Holden Professor of Management Science at the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University. He received a Ph.D. from the Operations Research Department at Stanford University in 1988. He was a professor at MIT's Sloan School of Management from 1988 to 2002. His research interests are in manufacturing and public health. Early in his career, Dr. Wein worked on heavy traffic analysis of queueing models for manufacturing systems, and his research on workload regulating release was implemented widely in the semiconductor industry. Later he worked on a variety of health problems related to kidney transplants, and treatments for HIV (which led to a successful multi-center clinical trial on drug switching protocols), cancer, Alzheimer’s disease and influenza. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, much of his research has focused on homeland security. His most recent work addresses post-traumatic stress disorder in Operation Iraqi Freedom soldiers, and space debris.
He was Editor-in-Chief of Operations Research from 2000 to 2005.
Wednesday, October 15
3:10pm-4:00pm
Engineering in the Entertainment Industry
Daniel P. Cook
Professor, Entertainment Engineering and Design Program
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Developments in technology drive, and in turn, are driven by the entertainment industry. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the live theatrical productions created by Montreal-based Cirque du Soleil. Known originally for its acrobatics, Cirque du Soleil has become a powerhouse in the modern theatrical world through the sophisticated integration of automation systems into its shows to control motion, lighting, audio, pyrotechnic, and projection effects. This presentation will focus on the show Ka, the $200 million Cirque du Soleil production located at the MGM Grand
hotel and casino in Las Vegas, and will give a backstage look at how technology allows Cirque du Soleil to breath new life into familiar stories.
 Daniel P. Cook has spent the last three years working extensively with entertainment companies such as Cirque du Soleil as coordinator of UNLV's new Entertainment Engineering and Design program. He spent the summer of 2007 employed as an on-call stage hand at Cirque's show Ka in order to gain a first-hand understanding of how technology is incorporated into the modern, live entertainment industry. His more traditional engineering experience includes work for Reynolds Metals, Phillip Morris, Hamilton-Beach, Alcoa, and Apple Computer. He holds a B.S. in Metallurgical Engineering from Ohio State, and a Ph.D. in Materials Science from the University of California, Berkeley. |
